EU’s oil ban: if market friction is low, so is the pain for Russia - FT中文网
登录×
电子邮件/用户名
密码
记住我
请输入邮箱和密码进行绑定操作:
请输入手机号码,通过短信验证(目前仅支持中国大陆地区的手机号):
请您阅读我们的用户注册协议隐私权保护政策,点击下方按钮即视为您接受。
FT商学院

EU’s oil ban: if market friction is low, so is the pain for Russia

The bloc’s agreed partial embargo may prove to be ineffective as higher prices could compensate for reduced volumes

The aim of economic warfare is to inflict maximum pain at minimum cost. Achieving that is hard when the target is a key commodity producer. The EU’s agreement to ban most Russian oil imports reflects justified outrage at the barbaric invasion of Ukraine. But it may prove to be ineffective.

The problem with oil is that it is traded internationally. Higher prices may compensate Russia for reduced volumes, as US Treasury secretary Janet Yellen argued in April. Equally, customers in the EU and outside it may swap sources of supply in response to price signals, with little ultimate impact on the Russian exchequer.

The lower the level of substitution, the more powerful the partial embargo. Some countries, for example, lack refineries that can process Urals, Russia’s sulphurous main export blend.

That is not a problem for China and India. They have already moved to fill the gap in demand for Russian oil created by self-sanctioning by European refiners and traders. India rarely bought Russian oil in the past. But it emerged as the largest purchaser of Russian Urals crude in April, according to S&P Global.

Asian countries may not take up the full slack in demand for Russian oil, however, fearing retaliatory western sanctions. Capital Economics thinks Russia’s oil exports will fall by a fifth this year, even allowing for a 15 per cent rise in exports to non-western countries. But after factoring in higher prices, the consultancy estimates that Russia’s oil export revenues will be $180bn, a mere $2bn lower than in 2021.

The gap between Brent and Urals crude — currently $31 — may eventually fall in response to substitution. One response from the west may be to ban its insurers from covering tankers carrying Russian oil. Creating friction of a logistical kind is one way of compensating for a lack of it in markets.

Even after the oil embargo is fully phased in next year, it may be more than offset by higher gas prices. The oil embargo reduces Europe’s financial complicity. It will not, by itself, sabotage the Russian war machine.

版权声明:本文版权归FT中文网所有,未经允许任何单位或个人不得转载,复制或以任何其他方式使用本文全部或部分,侵权必究。

争夺月球电波的竞赛

FT研究发现,商业无线电频谱申请份额的增加显示出对未来月球经济的押注。

中国的太阳能行业可能再次发出耀眼的光芒

在经历了产能过剩和价格下跌的困扰后,有迹象表明该行业可能正在接近底部。

洛杉矶的标志性社区化为灰烬

成千上万的房屋和企业被摧毁后,好莱坞之乡艰难应对。

IMF警告:特朗普关税威胁加剧全球经济不确定性

国际货币基金组织总裁格奥尔基耶娃表示,美国贸易政策的不可预测性正在推高全球的借贷成本。

与特朗普打交道的艺术

当选总统关于潜在领土扩张的激进主张,是盟友学习其谈判策略的速成课程。

美元的主导地位意味着关税不是唯一的手段

美国对全球金融服务的掌控可能为特朗普提供另一种施压手段。
设置字号×
最小
较小
默认
较大
最大
分享×